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Recent studies of children with developmental
disorders provide striking insights into the nature of
language. These studies suggest that, although much of
language arises from more general cognitive capacities,
certain aspects of grammar have an autonomous
psychological and neural basis. 
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Some of the more heated debates in the cognitive sciences
revolve around the nature of human language. Is there
innate linguistic knowledge? Does language require the
ability to learn and use symbolic rules, or can it be explained
solely through associative capacities? And how autonomous
is language — is the ability to learn to speak the result of
more general social, cognitive and perceptual abilities, or is
there a separate language module, instinct or organ?
One source of insight into these issues is the study of
children with developmental disorders. Heather van der
Lely and colleagues [1] recently presented in Current
Biology an extensive case-study of a 10 year old boy, known
as AZ, who suffers from a disorder known as specific lan-
guage impairment. Specific language impairment is largely
inherited, and some of AZ’s family members reported that
they suffered from a milder form of the same disorder.
The problems that AZ have are not subtle. He speaks in
short sentences, omits words and phrases — “What cat
Mrs. White stroked?”, “The dog was poking in” — and
makes errors with agreement — “My Mum make the
breakfast”, “What did Mrs. Brown dropped?”. He does not
use complex or embedded phrases, such as “the small
black dog” or “the cat with the blanket”, which are
common in the speech of children half his age.
Children with specific language impairment are not rare,
but what makes AZ such an interesting case is that in all
other regards he is either normal or better-than-normal. His
articulation is fine and so is his hearing. He has an above
average non-verbal IQ, and does well at problems that
involve symbol manipulation, such as logical puzzles and
transitive inference. He can solve analogy tasks, such as
“Kipper is to fish, as cheddar is to ___”. But at the same
time, he fails to understand even fairly simple aspects of
grammar. (This is similar to a child discussed by Gopnik
and Crago [2], who has severe problems with grammar, but
is a whiz at mathematics and computer programming.) As
van der Lely and colleagues [1] are careful to note, there
do exist children with specific language impairment who
have cognitive, social, or processing deficits [3]. This might
even be so for most cases of specific language impairment.
Nevertheless, AZ is not unique; there are a host of other
children that apparently exhibit the same dissociation
between grammar and other mental processes [1].
As specific language impairment runs in families, the
finding of a grammar-specific deficit is often cited in the
popular press as evidence for “a gene for grammar”. But
this is very unlikely. Given the computational and neural
complexity of human grammatical abilities, they are
unlikely to be under the control of a single gene —
although it might well be that it is an abnormality in a
single gene that disrupts or destroys AZ’s ability to use
grammar [4]. A better way of looking at such a deficit is
that it provides evidence for an innate specialization for
grammar, precisely of the sort proposed by Noam
Chomsky [5] and other modern-day nativists [4].
One reason why developmental disorders are so interest-
ing is that they help us determine the structure of the
normal mind. In the case of AZ, they support the view that
grammar is distinct, not only from other aspects of sym-
bolic reasoning (such as logic), but also from other parts of
language itself. For instance, AZ knows full well that the
“himself” in “Mowgli says Baboo is tickling himself” must
refer to a male (knowledge of semantics), and he appreci-
ates that pronouns in general must refer to people that par-
ticipants in a conversation are familiar with (knowledge of
pragmatics). But although even much younger children
understand that “Mowgli says Baboo is tickling himself”
must mean that Mowgli says Baboo is tickling Baboo, AZ
has no understanding of this grammatical principle, and so
does not make any distinction between the quite different
sentences “Mowgli says Baboo is tickling himself” and
“Mowgli says Baboo is tickling him”. 
It is interesting that AZ’s problems are not limited to
syntax. They extend as well to understanding simple rules
of morphology that involve the construction of new words.
AZ doesn’t have any understanding, for instance, that you
can take a new verb in the present-tense and turn it into a
past-tense form by adding ‘-ed’. Again, this is knowledge
that much younger children possess. So when told “Every
day I plam at Susan. Yesterday I ___ at Susan”, normal chil-
dren will usually say “plammed”. But AZ does not; he just
parrots back the original word, “plam”. AZ’s problem with
‘grammar’, then, extends to both syntax and morphology,
though apparently not to phonology, which is the system
of rules governing the sounds of words. 
What about vocabulary? Some scholars who reject the
notion of specifically grammatical capacities have argued
that syntax learning and word learning are done through
the very same general mechanism [6]. Other see a sharp
distinction between the two, arguing that the module that
underlies grammar acquisition is distinct from the capaci-
ties involved in word learning [4]. This raises the ques-
tion of whether vocabulary is impaired along with
grammar in children such as AZ. The data here are some-
what mixed. AZ was late in speaking and he does show a
vocabulary impairment, though not one as severe as his
grammar impairment — he has the vocabulary of a normal
seven year old. 
One theory that might account for this more mild deficit is
that there are (at least) two mechanisms involved in
normal word learning. The first involves the use of per-
ceptual and social cues, and is most relevant for the learn-
ing of concrete nouns such as “chair” and “dog”, as well as
verbs such “kick” and “smile”. The other involves the use
of grammatical cues, and is relevant for the learning of
more abstract nouns such as “story” and “game”, and for
verbs such as “think” and “see”. It might be that AZ’s
impairment in word learning exists only for this second
type of learning. Supporting this, there is experimental
evidence that children with specific language impairment
face a particular problem using syntax to learn the mean-
ings of verbs [7].
If this first type of learning really is autonomous from
grammar, then we might expect to find children who show
the opposite pattern to AZ: children who have problems
with vocabulary, but are grammatically normal. Some
autistic children seem to fall into this group. Their pro-
duction and comprehension of grammar is relatively
normal [8], but they have serious problems learning con-
crete nouns. This is perhaps because autism involves a
deficit in social cognition, and hence these children find it
difficult to figure out what people are referring to when
they use new words to refer to entities in the world [9].
There is a growing body of evidence from studies of
normal children that word learning relies on the same
systems of inference and memory that apply to the learn-
ing of social facts more generally [10]. This does not seem
to be the case with grammar, however, which is why there
could exist a child such as AZ who is fully normal at every
type of learning — except for the learning of grammar.
Cases such as AZ pose a problem for the orthodox view in
developmental psychology. Many developmentalists
endorse the common sense notion that language is a by-
product of general intelligence; we learn and use language
because we are, in some to-be-specified way, just plain
smart. From an evolutionary perspective, it is argued that,
while other animals have evolved dedicated modules or
instincts, the unique thing about humans is our plasticity.
As Karmiloff-Smith [11] puts it, evolution has “made the
human neocortex increasingly flexible and open to learning
during postnatal development”. Domain-specific deficits
might exist, under this view, but they must emerge from
more general difficulties in perception and cognition, not
from damage to genetically-specified modules. 
The alternative is that there is no sharp discontinuity
between humans and other animals — like many other
animals, we have evolved a specialized communication
system, one that is distinct from other aspects of cogni-
tion, and which can be selectively impaired [12]. Explor-
ing this alternative through the study of developmental
disorders has the promise of informing us about the struc-
ture of the human mind, and potentially about its neural
and genetic foundations. 
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